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±¹Á¦ ¿©¼ºÁ¤Ä¡ ¿¬±¸ÀÚ·á July-2010 |
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2010. 08. 17 |
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First,
Amy King and Andrew Leigh, 2010(Published Online: Oct-21-2009), Beautiful Politicians, Kyklos, Vol.62, Issue4, pp.579-593
Abstract: Are beautiful politicians more likely to be elected? To test this, we use evidence from Australia, a country in which voting is compulsory, and in which voters are given 'How-to-vote'cards, depicting photos of the major party candidates, as they arrive to vote. Using raters chosen to be representative of the electorate, we assess the beauty of political candidates from major political parties, and then estimate the effect of beauty on voteshare for candidates in the 2004 federal election. Beautiful candidates are indeed more likely to be elected, with a one standard deviation increase in beauty associated with a 1¨ö-2 percentage point increase in voteshare. Our results are robust to several specification checks: adding party fixed effects, dropping well-known politicians, using non-Australian beauty raters, omitting candidates of non-Anglo appearance, controlling for age, and analyzing the 'beauty-gap' between candidates running in the same electorate. The marginal effect of beauty is larger for male candidates than for female candidates, and appears to be approximately linear. Consistent with the theory that returns to beauty reflect discrimination, we find suggestive evidence that beauty matters more in electorates with a higher share of apathetic voters.
- http://ideas.repec.org/p/auu/dpaper/616.html
Second,
Amy King and Andrew Leigh, 2010(Published Online: Apr-6 2010), Bias at the ballet box? Testing whether candidates' gender affects their vote, Social science quartrly, Vol.91, Issue2, pp.324-343
Abstract: Objective. This study examines whether women's electoral fortunes in Australia have improved in line with changing social norms over the past century. We use new strategies to explore whether female candidates face discrimination by the voting public, or by political parties' preselection systems. Methods. Using data from all elections to the House of Representatives between 1903 and 2004, we examine the relationship between candidates' gender and their share of the vote. We consider the electoral performances of female independent candidates, female incumbents, and female candidates from the Australian Labor Party (after 2001) in order to determine whether the bias against female candidates is driven by voters or preselectors. We also make use of gender pay gap and attitudinal data to examine how the ballot box penalty has shifted in line with changing social norms. Results. We find that the vote share of female candidates is 0.6 percentage points smaller than that of male candidates (for major parties, the gap widens to 1.5 percentage points), but find little evidence that the party preselection system is responsible for the voting bias against women. Over time, the gap between male and female candidates has shrunk considerably as a result of changes in social norms (as proxied by the gender pay gap and attitudinal data) and the share of female candidates running nationwide. Conclusions. A statistically significant gender penalty has been a consistent feature of Australian federal elections since 1903. The penalty against female candidates has narrowed since the 1980s, and this bias lies with the voting public rather than with the political parties themselves. We find little evidence that party-based affirmative action policies have reduced the gender penalty against female candidates.
- http://people.anu.edu.au/andrew.leigh/pdf/BiasBallotBox.pdf
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